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Abstract: 
I argue that one of John Locke's intentions in writing Two Treatises of Government was to turn the tables 
on Sir Robert Filmer and his followers when it came to the question of practical consequences of writing 
and publishing political philosophy. According to Locke, it was Filmer's thesis of natural subjection that 
had seditious ramifications. I show first that Locke is correct in his claim that in Patriarcha Filmer is, by 
his own admission and according to the logic of his own argument, a theorist of de facto political power. 
This meant, according to Locke, that Filmer has no account of the moral basis of allegiance. To that extent, 
Filmer has no case to make against the usurper. On other hand, I then argue, there is evidence in the Second 
Treatise that Locke was attuned to the worries that Filmer raises about the consequences of the thesis of 
natural liberty. Locke sought, in a number of ways, to contain the potentially destabilizing implications of 
his own conclusions. In conclusion I make a tentative suggestion as to how this concern with the practical 
consequences of flawed political theory might explain Locke's decision to publish both of the two Treatises 
in 1689. 
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There cannot be done a greater Mischief to Prince 
and People, than the Propagating wrong Notions 
concerning Government. 
— John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 
1. Section One 
In his political thought Sir Robert Filmer makes two central claims: first, that the 
sovereign power possessed by kings over their subjects is absolute and unlimited and, 
secondly, that kings have this power naturally, in exactly the same way that fathers 
naturally have absolute power over their children (and over the rest of their households).1 
In his commitment to an uncompromisingly absolutist theory of sovereignty, Filmer was 
deeply influenced by Jean Bodin. Filmer shared Bodin's sense of the absolute political 
necessity of a power that is above the law and, precisely because it is above the law, has 
the capacity to make law.2 There could be no law, Filmer insisted, where such a power did 
not exist. Filmer's writings on this topic were directed against the parliamentarian 
propagandists of the 1630s and 1640s in general, and, in the case of The Anarchy of a 
Limited or Mixed Monarchy (1643), against Philip Hunton in particular.3 In his belief in 
the naturalness of monarchical power Filmer took himself simply to be following the 
Bible, especially the Old Testament.4 He stood against a range of what he regarded as 
innovators in political philosophy, including both Jesuits, such as Robert Bellarmine and 
Robert Parsons, and Protestant resistance theorists, such as George Buchanan, as well as 
                                                 
1 On Filmer's political thought, see: Peter Laslett, Introduction to Patriarcha and Other Political 
Works, by Robert Filmer, ed Peter Laslett (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1949); James Daly, Sir Robert Filmer 
and English Political Thought (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979); Gordon J. Schochet, 
Patriarchalism in Political Thought: The Authoritarian Family in Political Speculation and Attitudes 
Especially in Seventeenth-Century England (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975), chs. 7 and 8: 115-58; Johann 
P. Sommerville, Introduction to Patriarcha and Other Writings, by Robert Filmer ed. Johan P. 
Sommerville (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Cesare Cuttica, Sir Robert Filmer (1588–
1653) and the Patriotic Monarch: Patriarchalism in Seventeenth-Century Political Thought (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2012). 
2 Filmer's The Necessity of the Absolute Power of All Kings comprises nothing but quotations from the 
Richard Knolles translation of Bodin's Les six livres de la République. The first quotation states that “To 
majesty or sovereignty belongeth an absolute power not subject to any law.” Filmer, Necessity, in 
Patriarcha and Other Writings, 173. 
3 The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy is an attempted refutation of Hunton's A Treatise of 
Monarchie, published in 1643. “We do flatter ourselves,” Filmer begins, “if we hope ever to be governed 
without an arbitrary power. No, we mistake. The question is not, whether there shall be an arbitrary power, 
but the only point is who shall have that arbitrary power, whether one man or many? . . . For to make a law 
according to law, is contradictio in adjecto.” Filmer, Mixed Monarchy, in Patriarcha and Other Writings, 
132. 
4 As Laslett puts it, Filmer's “prime assumption” was that the Bible “contained the whole truth about 
the nature of the world and the nature of society.” Laslett adds later: “The enormous variety of political 
constitutions in the world as he knew it, and the obvious fact that political authority was being exercised in 
a way which contradicted his theory about its origin, he explained by the fact that the truth about politics 
had been preserved in only one of the world's peoples—that is among God's Chosen People—amongst the 
Israelites.” Laslett, Introduction to Patriarcha and Other Political Works, 11, 14. 
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more recent writers, like Hugo Grotius, John Milton, and Thomas Hobbes. Filmer was 
well aware that one might have an absolutist conception of sovereignty without believing 
in the naturalness of sovereign authority. His fellow royalist and exact contemporary 
Hobbes (born, like Filmer, in 1588) was an especially significant case in point. Filmer's 
view, however, was that without the naturalness thesis, an absolutist theory of sovereignty 
had no secure foundation. He worried that a denial of the naturalness thesis would lead 
not to Hobbes's conclusions, which Filmer approved of,5 but rather to the kind of mixed 
and limited monarchy argued for by Hunton. Establishing the naturalness thesis was 
Filmer's main concern in Patriarcha (1680), the subtitle of which is “The Naturall Power 
of Kinges Defended against the Unnatural Liberty of the People.” In Patriarcha Filmer 
argued that the first kings were fathers of families; that it is unnatural for the people to 
govern or choose their governors; and that positive laws do not infringe the natural or 
fatherly power of kings. The first draft of the book appears to have been written over a 
period of several years in the 1620s and early 1630s, but for reasons which remain 
obscure, Filmer himself never published it.6 
Filmer's texts began to be reissued piecemeal in 1679 and a collected works including 
Patriarcha appeared in 1680.7 In the preface to an edition of Patriarcha published in 
1685, the pro-Stuart pamphleteer (and later licenser of the press) Edmund Bohun asked 
his reader to remember the circumstances of 1679 and 1680 and the “extravagant hopes 
some Men then had that there was a Change at Hand, and that the Commonwealth of 
England might take another turn upon the Stage.”8 The sense that the Exclusion Crisis 
might lead England back to the violence of the 1640s was heightened by the republication 
of political works from the Civil War period. Hunton's Treatise on Monarchie (1643) was 
reissued in 1680. Henry Parker's Political Catechism (1643), to take another example of 
a key Parliamentarian text, was brought out in a new edition in 1679. The revival of these 
and similar books was, presumably, part of what made Filmer look so relevant as to be 
worth re-publishing.9 The preface, written by “a friend,” to a 1680 printing of Filmer's 
                                                 
5 “I consent with [Hobbes] about the rights of exercising government,” Filmer says in the Preface to 
Observations concerning the Originall of Government, “but I cannot agree to his means of acquiring it.” 
Filmer, Observations, in Patriarcha and Other Writings, 184. 
6 On the dating of the composition of Patriarcha, see Richard Tuck, “A New Date for Filmer's 
Patriarcha,” Historical Journal 29, no. 1 (March 1986): 183–86 and Sommerville, Introduction to 
Patriarcha and Other Writings, xxxii–xxxiv. On why Filmer did not publish Patriarcha in the 1630's, see 
Cuttica, Sir Robert Filmer, chap. 5, 143–60. Tuck's dating makes it clear that the composition of Patriarcha 
predated the controversies that led to the Civil War, and predated also the first published iteration of 
Hobbes's political thought. Seeking to explain why Filmer never published Patriarcha, Daly remarks that 
“Filmer's work was all of a piece, and he might well feel that there was no point in publishing his first work 
when occasion seemed to prompt him to expand parts of it instead.” Daly, Sir Robert Filmer, 14. 
7 Political Discourses of Sir Robert Filmer, Baronet (London, 1680). Filmer’s Patriarcha: or The 
Natural Power of Kings appears to have been published simultaneously as a self-standing work, in London, 
printed for Walter Davis and, separately but with the same pagination, for Richard Chiswell et al. 
8 Sir Robert Filmer, Patriarcha: or the Natural Power of Kings, ed. Edmund Bohun (London: printed 
for R. Chiswel  et al., 1685), "Preface" [no pagination]. 
9 The paradox, of course, is that no one had taken Filmer to be very relevant thirty years earlier, when 
most of his books were originally published. Laslett claims that “when Patriarcha appeared in print in 1680 
its thesis had a cogency which it might have lacked in any other year in English history . . . . Charles II, his 
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The Power of Kings asserted that Filmer's “Political Writings are chiefly levell'd against a 
Doctrine but too generally embrac'd of late, That all men are born equal.”10 The reader 
of Filmer in 1679 and the early 1680s was meant to learn that the doctrine of natural 
equality was subversive of the sovereignty properly possessed by all kings, English kings 
no less than others. According to Bohun, Filmer “asserts two things: First, that no Prince 
is, or is intended to be, so bound by his Coronation Oath as not to have a Power left him 
of Consulting the Good of his Subjects and his own Preservation notwithstanding his 
Oath. And secondly, that if he breaks his Oath, and Acts against his Laws, he is not 
responsible to, or punishable by his Subjects.”11 It was Algernon Sidney's refusal to accept 
the second of these assertions, and his criticism of Filmer on this score in a manuscript 
discovered in his desk, that led to his execution.12 As Bohun put it, Sidney might possibly 
have died a natural death had he not “left the Multitude at liberty to change the form of 
Government, which was set up, as often as they pleased.”13 It was with the assertion of 
such a right this, so Filmer had shown, that the doctrine of natural equality always ended 
up. The doctrine of natural liberty put subjects on a level with their rulers, and so gave 
subjects reason to challenge, and seek to replace, their rulers whenever they came to 
dislike them. Sedition, disorder, and bloodshed were the inevitable consequences. 
                                                 
Court and ministers and the whole body of opinion which favoured the continuance of the Restoration stood 
in desperate need of an argument which would vindicate legitimacy. Without it it looked as if the monarchy 
would be swept away.” Laslett, Introduction to Patriarcha and Other Political Works, 33. Mark Goldie 
explains Filmer's relevance in 1679 and 1680 in terms of the fact that “to caricature, his theory amounted 
to Bodin plus the Bible.” Mark Goldie, “John Locke and Anglican Royalism,” Political Studies 31, no. 1 
(March 1983): 61–85. What Filmer offered, in other words, was a theory of absolutism untainted by the 
“populism” (to use Schochet's term) that was, regardless of the conclusions they in fact sought to establish, 
inherent in the contract theories of Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf. As Glenn Burgess puts it, “it was of 
immense value to the Tory rejection of both resistance theory and republicanism to be able to show that the 
people did not have, and never had, any political authority independent of their rulers.” Glenn Burgess, 
Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 215. Daly, on 
the other hand, claims that Filmer was highly atypical among English political thinkers, both in the 1640s 
and in the 1670s and 1680s, precisely in virtue of his commitment to a Bodinian theory of sovereignty. This 
helps Daly explain why Locke took Filmer rather than some other Tory propagandist as his target, but 
obstructs an account of why Filmer was republished during the Exclusion Crisis. Daly, Sir Robert Filmer, 
chap. 6, 124–50. 
10 Sir Robert Filmer, The Power of Kings: And in Particular, Of the King of England . . . With a Preface 
of a Friend, Giving an Account of the Author and His Work (London: printed for W.H. and T.F., 1680), 
"Preface" [no pagination]. 
11 Bohun, Preface to Patriarcha, n.p. This would seem to speak against Burgess's claim, made in defence 
of Daly's reading of Filmer, that Bohun was uninterested in Filmer's absolutism: see Burgess, Absolute 
Monarchy, 215. 
12 Jonathan Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677–1683 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), chap. 14, 317–47. 
13 Edmund Bohun, A Defence of Sir Robert Filmer, Against the Mistakes and Misrepresentations of 
Algernon Sidney, Esq. (London, 1684), 9. 
5 
 
One of John Locke's intentions in Two Treatises of Government,14 I shall argue here, 
was to turn the tables on Filmer and his followers when it came to the question of practical 
consequences. It was, according to Locke, Filmer's thesis of natural subjection that had 
seditious ramifications. Locke's argument in the First Treatise is that the moral authority 
of government over an individual cannot be established if that government's authority is 
said to be natural—or, what amounts to the same thing, if its authority is taken to have 
nothing to do with the individual subject's consent. For if natural liberty is denied and 
consent is taken to be irrelevant, then there is no way of distinguishing between legitimate 
rule and usurpation. Then de facto power is, necessarily, legitimate power. No king has 
any better claim to authority than a usurper such as Oliver Cromwell. And this could only 
give encouragement to potential usurpers in the future. 
I show in what follows that in Patriarcha Filmer was indeed, by his own admission 
and according to the logic of his own argument, a theorist of de facto political power. The 
importance for any viable form of politics of an absolutist mode of sovereignty, is, Filmer 
thinks, such that it does not matter in the end how sovereign power is acquired. A fortiori, 
it does not matter that a claimant to political power be able to justify his claim by proving 
himself to be an heir to the first king, Adam. Exegesis of the Old Testament turns out not 
to be the heart of Filmer's political thinking. I then argue that there is evidence in the 
Second Treatise that Locke was attuned to the worries that Filmer raises about the 
consequences of the thesis of natural liberty. I depict the Locke of the Second Treatise as 
wanting to show that, despite the fact that it follows from the doctrine of natural liberty 
and equality that governmental power is by definition limited and that there is therefore 
a right of resistance, the doctrine of natural liberty and equality does not provide a 
justification for rebellion. Locke seeks, in a number of ways, to contain the potentially 
destabilizing implications of his own conclusions. Filmer and Locke were both of their 
time, in other words, in having an acute sensitivity to the question of the practical 
consequences of theorizing about politics, and especially to the dangerous consequences 
of theorizing about politics badly. In conclusion I make a tentative suggestion as to how 
this concern with the practical consequences of flawed political theory might explain 
Locke's decision to publish both of the two Treatises soon after the Glorious Revolution. 
2. Section Two 
Locke's engagement with Filmer in the First Treatise has received a fraction of the 
scholarly attention given to the “essay on civil government” laid out in the Second. 
Nineteenth-century readers of Locke found it unintelligible that Locke had spent so much 
time refuting the ideas of a nonentity like Filmer when he could, and should, have 
concentrated his fire instead upon Hobbes. In his Introduction to the Science of Politics 
(1890), for example, Frederick Pollock simply ignored the First Treatise, and discussed 
the Second Treatise as if, in fact, Locke was arguing against Hobbes. T. H. Green did the 
same in Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (1895). Early twentieth-century 
                                                 
14 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett, Student Edition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988). Parenthetical citations of the Two Treatises will be to this edition in 
standard treatise-section-page format, for example II.13, 275–76 for Second Treatise, section 13, pages 
275–76. 
6 
 
textbooks followed suit.15 This was the trend in Locke scholarship that, in his work on 
Filmer and Locke in the 1940s and 1950s, Peter Laslett undertook to replace with an 
approach that paid much more attention to what, given the political circumstances of the 
late 1670s and early 1680s, Locke could be supposed to have been actually trying to do in 
the Two Treatises.16 Yet Laslett himself appears not to have found much of interest in the 
First Treatise. He dismisses it as “cumbersome,” “uninviting,” and “unreadable,” and 
argues that it was written after the Second Treatise as a kind of prelude.17 Those who have 
written specifically about the First Treatise have tended to follow the Straussian line that 
Locke's real agenda was the secularisation of politics. Thus according to Michael Zuckert, 
“the issue between Locke and Filmer . . . is the Biblical understanding of politics,”18 and 
according to Charles Tarlton, Locke's objective is to show “that God says nothing that 
bears on the political conscience.”19 Such claims are, plainly enough, at odds with the now 
generally accepted argument made by John Dunn to the effect that Locke's political 
thought is unintelligible when separated from his theology.20 Even so, Tarlton is 
absolutely right in his account of the argumentative strategies used by Locke in the First 
Treatise. As Tarlton shows, what Locke wants to establish is, first, that Filmer fails to 
elucidate the moral basis of political power and, secondly, that as a result Filmer's theory 
                                                 
15 On nineteenth and early twentieth-century readings of Locke, see Duncan Bell, “What is Liberalism,” 
Political Theory 42, no. 6 (December 2014): 682–715; and also James A. Harris, “The Interpretation of 
Locke's Two Treatises in Britain, 1778–1956,” The British Journal for the History of Philosophy, published 
ahead of print, November 7, 2019. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09608788.2019
.1677215.  
16 Laslett's 1949 edition of Filmer was followed by his challenge to the traditional dating of the 
composition of the Two Treatises in Peter Laslett, “The English Revolution and Locke's Two Treatises of 
Government,” The Cambridge Historical Journal 12, no. 1 (1956): 40–55. That article was then 
incorporated into the introduction to Laslett's First Edition of the Two Treatises (1960). 
17 Laslett asks “Who would deliberately choose to begin the exposition of a complicated theme by the 
refutation of another man's system without laying down his own premises?” Peter Laslett, Introduction to 
the Two Treatises of Government, by John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 62. This 
is not the most impressive moment in Laslett's treatment of the composition of the Two Treatises. 
18 Michael P. Zuckert, “An Introduction to Locke's First Treatise,” Interpretation 8, no. 1 (January 
1979): 65. Zuckert et al. conclude that, from Locke's point of view, “the Bible, almost to the same degree as 
Filmer himself, fails to lay the groundwork for a free politics.” Michael P. Zuckert, Jesse Covington, and 
James Thompson, “John Locke: Towards a Politics of Civil Liberty,” in Freedom and the Human Person, 
ed. Richard Velkley (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 180. 
19 Charles D. Tarlton, “A Rope of Sand: Interpreting Locke's First Treatise of Government.” The 
Historical Journal 21, no. 1 (March 1978): 64. 
20 John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of “Two 
Treatises of Government” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). There remains, of course, 
substantial disagreement as to what, exactly, the character of Locke's theology is and what role it plays in 
his political thought. For contrasting views, see Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke and Equality: Christian 
Foundations in Locke's Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), and Timothy 
Stanton, “Christian Foundations, or Some Loose Stones? Toleration and the Philosophy of Locke's Politics,” 
in “Toleration Re-examined,” ed. Derek Edyvane and Matt Matravers, special issue, Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy 14, no. 3 (June 2011): 323–47. 
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has destabilizing consequences, such that it will encourage usurpation, sedition, and 
rebellion. In this section I enlarge and elaborate upon Tarlton's account of how the 
argument of the First Treatise works.21 
Filmer's “great Position,” Locke says, correctly, “is that Men are not naturally free” 
(I.6, 144). Men are born into subjection—”slavery” is Locke's word22—to their parents and 
the power of kings over their subjects is that of a father over his children. The power of 
kings, on Filmer's view, is not merely analogous to the power of a father over his children. 
It is identical to the power of a father over his children.23 This is not to say that kings are, 
literally, fathers of their subjects—though that was so in the case of the very first kings. It 
is, rather, to say that kings have exactly the same kind and extent of power over their 
subjects as fathers have over their children. How do we know what the rightful power of 
a father over his children is? Filmer's answer is that we know this by considering the 
power given by God to Adam, who was not only the very first father but also the very first 
king. Having amassed a large number of quotations from Patriarcha in which Adam's 
paternal power is described, Locke summarizes it as “a Divine unalterable Right of 
Sovereignty, whereby a Father or a Prince hath an Absolute, Arbitrary, Unlimited, and 
Unlimitable Power, over the Lives, Liberties, and Estates of his Children and Subjects; so 
that he may take or alienate their Estates, sell, castrate, or use their Persons as he pleases, 
they being all his Slaves, and he Lord or Proprietor of every Thing, and his unbounded 
Will their Law” (I.9, 148). In the First Treatise, Locke concentrates his fire upon on two 
aspects of Filmer's thought: first, Filmer's account of Adam's sovereign power (I.15–77, 
151–99) and second, Filmer's account of how Adam's sovereign power was transferred to 
the kings who came after him (I.78–169, 199–263). Locke's contention in I.15–77 is that 
Filmer has no coherent account of what in virtue of which Adam might have had the kind 
of sovereign power that Filmer ascribes to him. Locke considers four possibilities in turn, 
all of which are used at some point by Filmer in either Patriarcha or his critiques of 
Hobbes, Milton, and Grotius in Observations concerning the Originall of Government 
(1652). Locke argues that none of these accounts could justify Filmer's claim as to the 
nature and extent of Adam's paternal authority. Locke spends most time on the idea that 
Adam's power over his children was a part of the property, or dominion, that God gave 
him over the entire world and on the idea that Adam's power derived simply from his 
having fathered or “begotten” his children. 
Filmer's account of how Adam's sovereign power was transferred to the kings who 
came after him is, Locke notes, just as important as his account of the origin and extent 
                                                 
21 Daly offers a brief but suggestive account of Locke's agenda in the First Treatise. He claims that 
“Filmer had made it possible for Locke to present his own alternative as both politically acceptable and 
genuinely related to the social facts of both history and contemporary family and political life.” Daly, Sir 
Robert Filmer, 163. 
22 “Slavery” is in fact the first word of the first chapter of the First Treatise (I.1, 141). 
23 Laslett points out that the idea of an analogy between the family and the state was commonplace in 
the early modern period. It was to be expected, he claims, “that sooner or later . . . thinkers would be found 
who could claim that the king was the father and the family was the state”: “Filmer's originality, in so far 
as he was an original writer at all, consisted in the boldness and clarity with which he formulated these two 
propositions.” Laslett, Introduction to Patriarcha and Other Political Works, 28. See also Schochet, 
Patriarchalism, 146–47. 
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of that power. It is not enough to know what kind of authority Adam had over his family. 
We need to know who has Adam's authority now. “'Tis in vain . . . to talk of Subjection 
and Obedience,” Locke remarks, “without telling us whom we are to obey” (I.81, 202). He 
adds later: “The great Question which in all Ages has disturbed Mankind, and brought on 
them the greatest part of those Mischiefs which have ruin'd Cities, depopulated Countries, 
and disordered the Peace of the World, has been, Not whether there be Power in the 
World, nor whence it came, but who should have it” (I.106, 218–19). Locke points out that 
Filmer describes no fewer than four ways in which sovereignty is transferred: by 
succession (that is, inheritance), by grant (or donation), by election, and by usurpation 
(I.78, 200). In the original full version of the First Treatise, Locke probably considered 
each of these modes of transferral in turn.24 He says at one point that he will “leave 
[Filmer's] Title of Usurpers to be examin'd in its due place” (I.121, 229), but there is no 
such examination in the published text. In the text as we have it, Locke examines only 
monarchy by inheritance, which is, as he says, “that which [Filmer] chiefly insists on” 
(I.84, 204). Thus, Locke rejects the heritability of sovereignty considered as property 
(I.85–97, 204–13) and the heritability of sovereignty derived from begetting (I.98–103, 
213–16). Then Locke argues that even if sovereign power were heritable in the way Filmer 
says it is, Filmer would still lack a means of telling us whom we are to obey now. Filmer's 
argument leads either to the conclusion that there is at any one time only one proper king 
in the world (the eldest son of the eldest son of the eldest son . . . stretching all the way 
back to Adam) or to the conclusion that every descendant of Adam is properly a king 
(I.105, 217–18). In the concluding chapter, by some way the longest chapter of the entire 
Two Treatises, Locke expands on Filmer's problems in avoiding the latter conclusion and 
in identifying who in a given set of historical circumstances might be the proper heir to 
Adam's sovereign authority. It turns out, according to Locke, that Filmer in fact 
understands this right of inheritance to be not a matter of natural law but the result of 
special divine institution. Crucially, this, and only this, is how an eldest son can be said to 
inherit from his father authority over his brothers. An eldest son, obviously enough, 
cannot inherit from his father an authority derived from his father's having begotten both 
himself and his brothers (I.119, 227–28; I.128–29, 234–36). What Locke is especially 
keen to bring out is that Filmer's necessary recourse to special institution has the 
consequence that it may very well be, from the human point of view, impossible to know 
who the rightful heir is. “This Divine Institution,” he adds, “which assigns [right to power] 
to a Person, whom we have no Rule to know, is just as good as an Assignment to no body 
at all” (I.127, 234). 
Locke spends a lot of time on the inherent inscrutability of the line of succession in 
Filmer's reading of the transfer of regal power in the Old Testament. What might well 
have been the grand conclusion of Locke's complete treatment of Filmer is mentioned 
only in passing, when Locke observes that “Filmer is fain to resolve all into present 
                                                 
24 Locke says in the Preface to the Two Treatises (137) that what he presents to the reader is “the 
Beginning and End of a Discourse concerning Government.” “The Papers that should have filled up the 
middle,” he also says, “were more than all the rest.” It seems likely that what is missing is the rest of Locke's 
answer to Filmer and that this missing part was “more” in the sense of being longer, not in the sense of 
being of greater importance. “I imagine,” Locke adds, “I shall have neither the time, nor inclination to repeat 
my Pains, and fill up the wanting part of my Answer, by tracing Sir Robert again, through all the Windings 
and Obscurities which are to be met with in the several Branches of his wonderful System.” 
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Possession, and makes Civil Obedience as due to an Usurper as to a lawful King; and 
thereby the Usurper's Title as good” (I.121, 229–30). Locke's ultimate aim is to show that 
the actual consequence of Filmer's thought, when it comes to the exigencies of the present 
day, is a dilemma: either no one should be accorded sovereign authority because we 
cannot tell who the real heir of Adam is, which would mean the dethroning of all princes 
and so anarchy, or present possession is sufficient evidence for title to authority because 
there is no better source of evidence. And if present possession is sufficient, “all this ado 
about Adam's Fatherhood,” as Locke puts it, was a waste of time and effort (I.125, 232). 
It transpires that in fact it does not matter how power was acquired, whether by 
inheritance, or donation, or election, or even usurpation. As Locke remarks earlier on in 
the First Treatise, Filmer “might have spared the trouble of speaking so much, as he does, 
up and down of Heirs and Inheritance, if to make any one properly a King, needs no more 
but Governing by Supreme Power, and it matters not by what Means he came by it” 
(I.78, 200). Such a position, Locke points out, leads to exactly the conclusion that, 
presumably, Filmer was most concerned to avoid: that the usurper Oliver Cromwell was 
“as properly King, as any one else he could think of” (I.79, 201). Filmer, Locke continues, 
“is the first Politician, who, pretending to settle Government on its true Basis, and to 
establish the Thrones of Lawful Princes, ever told the World, That he was properly a King, 
whose Manner was by Supreme Power, by what Means soever he obtained it” (I.79, 
201). Locke calls this a “strange Doctrine” (I.80, 201). It is strange because it amounts to 
giving up on the question of how to distinguish between legitimate from illegitimate 
power and on the whole problem of what justifies power and gives it a claim to the 
obedience of subjects. Power, it turns out, justifies itself.25 
Locke is not being unfair to Filmer here. One of Filmer's main objectives in Patriarcha 
is to discredit the idea that sovereign power naturally inheres in “the multitude,” such that 
kings have sovereign power—the right to make law—only in so far as the multitude 
bestows it upon them. Filmer admits that this idea is likely to look plausible especially 
where a king dies without a living son. For then it looks as though no one is naturally 
entitled to sovereign authority. However, Filmer says, in such circumstances the kingly 
power “escheats,” not to the multitude, but to “the prime and independent heads of 
families,” who then “consent in the uniting or conferring of their fatherly right of 
sovereign authority on whom they please.”26 But, in doing so, heads of families do not, 
properly speaking, make someone king. They elect, but they do not confer authority. 
                                                 
25 As noted above, Tarlton's claim is that the conclusion drawn by Locke in the First Treatise as a whole 
is that “God says nothing that bears on the political conscience.” Tarlton, “A Rope of Sand,” 64. It would be 
better to say that Locke's conclusion is that the Old Testament as interpreted by Filmer says nothing that 
bears on the political conscience. Locke himself holds, of course, that no reading of the Old Testament could 
tell us whom we are to obey now. But it does not follow from that that God says nothing that bears on the 
political conscience. No more than the Old Testament does the law of nature instruct us whom to obey, but 
it does establish limits on whose power it is permissible for us to consent to. See Dunn, Political Thought; 
Dunn, “Consent in the Political Theory of John Locke,” The Historical Journal 10, no. 2 (1967): 153–82. On 
the other hand, Dunn makes Locke sound rather too much like Filmer when he says that for Locke “All 
legitimate authority . . . exercised by one human being over another is an authority conferred upon him by 
God.” Dunn, Political Thought, 127. While political authority as such derives from God's having determined 
that government is necessary for human beings, it is, according to Locke, human beings themselves who 
choose who gets to exercise it. 
26 Filmer, Patriarcha, in Patriarcha and Other Writings, 11. 
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Filmer explains (if that is the right word) that “he that is so elected claims not his power 
as a donative from the people, but as being substituted properly by God, from whom he 
receives his royal charter of an universal father, though testified by the ministry of the 
heads of the people.”27 Heads of families, in other words, act as a kind of conduit through 
which God's will singles out one man as sovereign. This, then, is what Filmer means by 
the natural power of kings: negatively, that it is not given by the people or by any human 
being; positively, that it is given by God. And God's will may well be obscure. Filmer goes 
on immediately to say this: 
If it please God, for the correction of the prince or punishment of the people to 
suffer princes to be removed and others placed in their rooms, either by the 
factions of the nobility or rebellion of the people, in all such cases the judgment of 
God—who hath power to give and to take away kingdoms—is most just. Yet the 
ministry of men who execute God's judgments without commission is sinful and 
damnable. God doth but use and turn men's unrighteous acts to the performance 
of His righteous decrees. 
In all the kingdoms or commonwealths in the world, whether the prince be the 
supreme father of the people or but the true heir of such a father, or whether he 
come to crown by usurpation, or by election of the nobles or of the people, or by 
any other way whatsoever, or whether some few or multitude govern the 
commonwealth, yet still the authority that is in any one, or in many, or in all of 
these, is the only right and natural authority of a supreme father. There is, and 
always shall be continued to the end of the world, a natural right of a supreme 
father over every multitude, although, by the secret will of God, many at first do 
most unjustly obtain the exercise of it.28 
In Chapter Three he makes the point again: “It skills not which way kings come by their 
power, whether by election, donation, succession or by any other means, for it is still the 
manner of government by supreme power that makes them properly kings, and not the 
means of obtaining their crowns.”29 Thus, Filmer appears to anticipate the arguments of 
those Royalists who, in the context of the Engagement Controversy of 1649, argued that 
possession of de facto power is sufficient for the possession of political authority.30  
                                                 
27 Flimer, Patriarcha, in Patriarcha and Other Writings, 11. 
28 Filmer, Patriarcha, in Patriarcha and Other Writings, 11. 
29 Filmer, Patriarcha, in Patriarcha and Other Writings, 44. The Oxford English Dictionary gives as 
one of the meanings of the verb “skill” “To make a difference, to be of importance, to matter.” OED Online, 
s.v. “skill (v.1),” December 2019. 
30 On the de facto element of Royalist political thought after the execution of Charles I, see Kinch 
Hoekstra, “The de facto Turn in Hobbes's Political Philosophy,” in Leviathan after 350 Years, ed. Tom 
Sorell and Luc Foisneau (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 33–73. Schochet (Patriarchalism, 153–58) notes 
that after 1649 Filmer appears to have modified his view of the authority of usurpers. This is suggested 
especially by the “Directions for Obedience to Government in Dangerous or Doubtful Times,” appended to 
Observations upon Aristotles Politiques (1652), where Filmer distinguishes between usurpers and lawful 
governors on the grounds that “some things . . . are unlawful to an usurper to enjoin.” Filmer, “Directions,” 
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It is worth stopping to ask why, according to Filmer, heads of families cannot make a 
king out of one of their number. In Chapter Two of Patriarcha, replying to the objection 
that there are examples of the election of kings in Scripture, Filmer says that “It is plain 
by an evident text, that it is one thing to choose a king, and another to set a king over the 
people. This latter power the children of Israel had, but not the former.”31 But does Filmer 
have an argument to show that kings can only be chosen by God? Fathers have absolute 
sovereignty over their families. Why can't they give that power to one of their fellow 
fathers? Filmer's thought must be that the authority of fathers is not theirs to give away. 
Fathers have it naturally, in virtue simply of being fathers, and you cannot give away the 
fact that you are a father—no more than you can give to someone else your attribute of 
being six feet tall. But what about the other aspect of Adam's sovereignty, not that which 
comes from begetting but that which comes from having been given as his personal 
property the Earth and everything in it, including Eve and the children they will have? 
Might fathers of families not be said to have property in their families, and might they not 
be able to give this property to someone else, namely to the one man they choose to be 
king? Then that king's authority might indeed properly be said to come from them, the 
fathers, rather than from God; and then the king's authority would not be, on Filmer's 
terms, natural. Filmer might reply that while this is conceivable, such that one man might 
be given power over the families of other fathers, what is at issue is the possibility of one 
man acquiring, by way of donation, power over other fathers. And perhaps he would go 
on to say that it is not the case that fathers have a power over themselves, which they are 
free to give to another. Fathers are absolutely free in respect of how they treat their 
families but are at the same time absolutely subject to the will of God their maker. They 
do not have dominion over themselves such that they can give themselves—give their 
lives—to another man. Locke is himself explicit about this being so with respect to all 
human beings. A “Man,” he says, “not having the Power of his own Life, cannot, by 
Compact, or his own Consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the 
Absolute, Arbitrary Power of another to take away his life, when he pleases” (II.23, 284). 
I think Filmer would have agreed. Both Locke and Filmer hold that human beings cannot 
give others absolute power over themselves. The conclusion Locke draws from this is that 
there can be no such thing as legitimate absolute power. The conclusion Filmer draws is 
that absolute power must be given to human beings by God. 
Locke does not engage directly with Filmer's theory of sovereignty in the First Treatise, 
except to make it clear that he thinks that there is a distinction to be drawn between power 
that is capable of making law and enforcing it and power that is entitled to make law and 
that deserves our obedience. That this distinction can be drawn matters for practical 
reasons. The deepest problem with Filmer's political thought, on Locke's view, is that it 
makes questionable the authority of any king whatsoever, and thus invites subversion and 
disorder. As we have seen, according to Locke Filmer faces a dilemma: either no king 
should be accorded legitimacy because it cannot be known for sure that any king is heir 
to Adam's sovereign power, or every king should be accorded legitimacy because 
possessing kingly power is sufficient evidence of title to that power. Both horns of the 
                                                 
in Patriarcha and Other Writings, 286. This qualification of the argument of Patriarcha goes unmentioned 
by Locke in the First Treatise. 
31 Filmer, Patriarcha, in Patriarcha and Other Writings, 21–22. 
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dilemma, Locke points out, have disastrous political consequences. On the first horn, 
there would, on Filmer's own terms, no longer be sovereign power in the world, hence no 
source of law and hence no laws. There would be anarchy. Filmer chooses the second horn 
when he says—as he has to—that it does not matter how a king acquired his crown. It does 
not matter, this is to say, whether or not a king can trace a line of inheritance back to 
Adam. Present possession of sovereign authority is sufficient for title to that authority. By 
Filmer's own admission, then, a usurper can be made into a lawful prince. And if that is 
so, then the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate political power has been 
surrendered.32 Filmer's notion of omnipotent fatherhood “can serve for nothing but to 
unsettle and destroy all the Lawful Governments in the World, and to Establish in their 
room Disorder, Tyranny, and Usurpation” (I.72, 194). If there is no means of saying who 
is a rightful prince, “there would be no distinction between Pirates and Lawful Princes, he 
that has Force is without any more ado to be obey'd, and Crowns and Scepters would 
become the Inheritance only of Violence and Rapine” (I.81, 203). If it is left disputable 
who should have power, “the skill used in dressing up Power with all the Splendor and 
Temptation Absoluteness can add to it, without shewing who has a Right to have it, will 
only serve to give a greater edge to Man's Natural Ambition, which of it self is but too 
keen. What can this do but set Men on the more eagerly to scramble, and so lay sure and 
lasting Foundation of endless Contention and Disorder, instead of that Peace and 
Tranquility, which is the business of Government, and the end of Humane Society?” 
(I.106, 219). Any would-be usurper of authority—any would-be Cromwell or Jack Cade—
will only be further incited by the belief that, if he succeeds, he will be entitled to the 
obedience of his subjects, simply in virtue of the fact that he has succeeded in gathering 
sovereign power into his hands. Therefore, having both argued for the slavery of 
absolutism and failing to provide the means whereby to identify who should have absolute 
power, Filmer has both “exposed all Subjects to the utmost Misery of Tyranny and 
Oppression,” and also “unsettled the Titles, and shaken the Thrones of Princes” (I.3, 
142).33 
Why did Filmer not see things this way? The answer may lie in his conviction that the 
present possession of sovereign power must be a manifestation of the will of God. This 
                                                 
32 As Ashcraft puts it, from Locke's point of view the de facto upshot of Filmer's argument undermines 
“the very point or meaning of a political theory, viewed in terms of its practical utility.” “Indeed,” Ashcraft 
says, “a poor political theory is worse than none at all, because by raising questions about the lawfulness of 
government and the subject's obligation to obey the magistrate that it cannot answer it actually has the 
effect of calling into question all grounds of obligation.” Richard Ashcraft, Locke's Two Treatises of 
Government (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 78; see also 160, where Ashcraft observes, rightly, that 
according to Locke “Filmer's theory actually turns into a justification for usurpation, which means that any 
de facto government automatically becomes legitimate.” 
33 On Filmer on usurpation and conquest, see Daly, Sir Robert Filmer, chap. 5, 104–23. As Daly (109) 
points out, it is puzzling why Filmer continues to use the word “usurper” at all: “Of whose claim would [the 
usurper's] be a usurpation? Why not pronounce him legitimate and avoid ambiguity? . . . He seems to have 
been anxious to veil usurpation in decent obscurity and let its practitioners have the benefit of the doubt.” 
Daly (72) remarks that Filmer's system “is often called patriarchalism, and yet fatherhood itself turns out 
to be the least secure and the most easily discredited foundation for the authority of Filmer's patriarch.” 
The consequence Daly draws is surely the correct one: that the core of Filmer's thought is his theory of 
sovereignty, not his patriarchalism. See also Sommerville, Introduction to Patriarcha and Other Writings, 
xxiii. 
13 
 
follows directly from the fact that—as we have seen Locke emphasise in his examination 
of Filmer's text—for Filmer every instance of the transference of sovereign authority from 
one man to another is by way of special divine institution. Anyone rebelling against a 
present possessor of sovereign power, then, is rebelling against God's will. God's will, as 
made manifest in the Bible, is that the present possessor of sovereign authority be obeyed. 
It might be that it is God's will that a particular king be replaced by someone else—but no 
one is in a position to know that that is God's will beforehand. God's will, as Filmer says 
in a passage quoted from above, is very often “secret.” A successful usurper is an 
instrument of God's will, just as all things and people are instruments of God's will. But 
that no more detracts from the sinfulness of usurpation than it detracts from the 
sinfulness of any other violation of the laws that God commands human beings to obey. 
Filmer, perhaps, was so concerned with the dangers inherent in dissociating political 
authority from the will of God and with the dangers inherent especially in 
contractarianism and the doctrine of natural liberty that he was unable to interest himself 
in the possible consequences of, in Locke's phrase, resolving all into present possession. 
The consequences of the doctrine of natural liberty were plainly so very much more 
rebarbative. That doctrine led inevitably—despite what Hobbes had argued—to a putative 
justification of a right of resistance. And resistance, Filmer claims, is always a remedy 
worse than the disease—the disease of tyranny—which it is supposed to cure. “The 
judgment of the multitude in disposing of the sovereignty may be seen in the Roman 
history,” Filmer points out, “where we may find many good emperors murdered by the 
people, and many bad elected by them.”34 The idea of a right of resistance vested in 
naturally free human beings was, according to Filmer, a recipe for political disaster. This 
is one of the themes of his reply to Hunton in The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed 
Monarchy. The conclusion of Hunton's argument is that “every man must oppose or not 
oppose the monarch according to his own conscience.” Hunton thus makes every man his 
own judge, and the result of that, Filmer claims, can only be “utter confusion.”35 
3. Section Three 
Filmer's case against Hunton in The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy concludes 
with the declaration that Hunton “instead of a treatise of monarchy . . . hath brought forth 
a treatise of anarchy.”36 The fundamental problem with Hunton's position, Filmer urges, 
is that it provides no rule whereby disputes about legitimacy can be settled in a limited 
monarchy. It is essential to a limited monarchy, as defined by Hunton, that the monarch 
“hath a Law beside his owne will for the measure of his power” in the form of “an originall 
constitution.”37 But when a question arises as to whether or not the king has violated that 
constitution, there is no political or legal process whereby the issue can be decided, for no 
                                                 
34 Filmer, Patriarcha, in Patriarcha and Other Writings, 33. 
35 Filmer, Mixed Monarchy, in Patriarcha and Other Writings, 153–54. 
36 Filmer, Mixed Monarchy, in Patriarcha and Other Writings, 150. On Hunton's political agenda in 
the Treatise of Monarchie, see John Sanderson, “Philip Hunton's ‘Appeasement’: Moderation and 
Extremism in the English Civil War,” History of Political Thought 3, no. 3 (Winter 1982): 447–61. 
37 Philip Hunton, A Treatise of Monarchie (London, 1643), 12–13. 
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one is empowered to cast judgment on the sovereign power in the realm. In circumstances 
of crisis, Hunton says, government has to be regarded as dissolved, and each individual 
is thrown back upon the resources of his conscience to decide the dispute. Here the power 
of judgment, Hunton insists, is moral, not political. That is how it has to be if the king's 
sovereignty is to be respected. No constituent of the body politic can be elevated above 
the king. “Every man (as farre as concernes him),” Hunton writes, “must follow the 
evidence of Truth in his own soule, to oppose, or not oppose, according as he can in 
conscience acquit or comdemne the act of carriage of the Governour.”38 Hunton himself 
is sure that subjects will find themselves in this kind of position very rarely. In all but the 
most extreme cases of the misuse of power, what is required of citizens is patience and 
obedience. But the fact that there are some conditions in which subjects are thrown back 
upon the moral resources of conscience is sufficient, according to Filmer, to show the 
dangerousness of Hunton's position. For, Filmer points out, there is no reason to think 
that individual subjects will judge the case in an impartial way. This, Filmer insists, is “a 
main point, since every man is prone to flatter himself in his own cause and to think it 
good, and that the wrong or injustice he suffers is apparent, when other moderate and 
indifferent men can discover no such thing.”39 Filmer makes the same argument in his 
consideration of Grotius in Observations concerning the Originall of Government. 
Grotius, according to Filmer, appears to allow that resistance might be justified when men 
find themselves in “in great and certain danger” from their governors, but he does not say 
who should be judge of such matters, “so that for aught appears to the contrary, his mind 
may be that every private man may be judge of the danger.” Grotius's silence here is 
reprehensible, Filmer adds, “considering how prone most of us are to censure and mistake 
those things for great and certain dangers which in truth many times are no dangers at 
all, or at the most but very small ones.”40 
Earlier on in the Observations, Filmer criticizes Hobbes on the same grounds. In 
allowing that a man cannot give up the right of resisting an attack upon his life, even if 
that attack is authorized by the sovereign, Hobbes, according to Filmer, surrenders his 
main argument. This is a doctrine “destructive to all government whatsoever, and even to 
the Leviathan itself” for it gives the individual subject the right to resist the sovereign 
when he judges that he is being assaulted with the intention of taking away his life.41 It is 
more usual to read Hobbes as having agreed with Filmer about the extent to which 
individual judgment is destructive of all government whatsoever.42 One of “the Diseases 
of a Common-wealth,” Hobbes argues in Leviathan, is precisely the doctrine “That every 
                                                 
38 Hunton, Monarchie, 18. 
39 Filmer, Mixed Monarchy, in Patriarcha and Other Writings, 152. 
40 Flimer, Observations, in Patriarcha and Other Writings, 220. 
41 Filmer, Observations, in Patriarcha and Other Writings, 195. For a consideration of seventeenth-
century criticism of Hobbes on this score, including Filmer's, see Susanne Sreedhar, Hobbes on Resistance: 
Defying the Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 16–24. 
42 See especially Richard Tuck's account of how, according to Hobbes, the judgments of the sovereign 
should stand in for the judgments of individual subjects in all matters of controversy: Richard Tuck, 
Philosophy and Government 1572–1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chap. 7, 279–345. 
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private man is Judge of Good and Evill actions.” “From this false doctrine," he claims, 
"men are disposed to debate with themselves, and dispute the commands of the Common-
wealth; and afterwards to obey, or disobey them, as in their private judgements they shall 
think fit. Whereby the Common-wealth is distracted and Weakened.”43 Filmer's criticism 
of Hobbes's residual right of resistance and his rejection of contract theory generally, 
should not obscure a fundamental agreement between the two philosophers about the 
fragility of political order and about the dangers inherent in granting individuals the right 
to judge when they are obliged to submit to authority and when they are not. A writer 
such as Hunton deserved criticism, according to Filmer, not just because of the 
incoherence of the idea that sovereign power has its origin in an original contract made 
by the people.44 Just as lamentable, if not more so, was the practical consequence of 
Hunton's theory. It intended to persuade the reader to understand himself to be a subject 
of a limited and mixed monarchy, and so could only be an encouragement of the reader 
in the time of crisis that was the 1640s to feel entitled to make up his own mind as to 
whether or not Charles I had violated the constitution. Hunton claimed that he wrote for 
“Peace and the re-uniting of this divided Body,”45 but in fact his kind of theorizing only 
made civil war more likely. 
I read Locke as sharing Filmer's—and Hobbes's—anxiety about the practical 
consequences of the writing and publishing of political philosophy.46 We have seen that 
in the First Treatise, Locke in effect turns Filmer's argument against Hunton, and against 
contract theory generally, back upon Filmer himself. The difficulty of knowing in the here 
and now who is a rightful inheritor of Adam's authority, Locke claims, leaves the 
individual subject with no sure rule whereby to determine to whom obedience is owed. As 
a direct result, the potential usurper has all the encouragement he is likely to need to try 
to prove himself an instrument of divine providence by replacing a king with a weak grip 
on power. And that will force everyone else into precisely the position that Filmer says is 
most dangerous, the position of having to try to decide the rights and wrongs of 
                                                 
43 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck, Revised Student Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 223. 
44 See especially Mixed Monarchy, in Patriarcha and Other Writings, 139–44, where Filmer argues 
that by “the people” the contract theorist must mean, in the first instance, every member of the (adult) 
human population of the world, such that everyone, or else a majority of everyone, must consent to the 
erection of a system of world governance or to the division of the human race into separate nations. It is 
striking that Locke simply ignores these arguments of Filmer's in the Second Treatise, presumably because 
he was not concerned there with laying out a systematic and complete theory of government. 
45 Hunton, Monarchie, 78. 
46 I think that A. John Simmons is right to ascribe to Locke a “constant concern for consequences,” 
though, as will become plain in what follows, I do not agree with his claim that “Locke's practical political 
aims were (in part) to precisely to rouse a sluggish people to resist tyranny.” A. John Simmons, On the Edge 
of Anarchy: Locke, Consent, and the Limits of Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 165–
66. I prefer Ruth W. Grant's way of putting it, when she observes that, according to Locke, “a successful 
political theory must establish a criterion for legitimate government that is a practicable standard. The task 
requires an explanation for the integrity of independent political communities and clear practical guidance 
for determining who should be obeyed and when . . . a theory that can meet these requirements will lay the 
foundation for peace.” Ruth W. Grant, John Locke's Liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987), 56. 
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fundamental political disputes. The first task of political philosophy is to tell the subject 
whom to obey, and Filmer's patriarchalism fails completely in this regard. But—and now 
I introduce the main theme of the second half of this paper—the conclusion to draw is not, 
for Locke, simply that Hunton was right and Filmer wrong. To a significant extent, I shall 
now argue, Locke was as worried as Filmer and Hobbes about the idea that the question 
of the extent of political obligation could be settled by the individual subject and his use 
of his conscience.47 Political argument which had the effect of empowering the individual 
subject to decide when the magistrate was to be obeyed and when he could be disobeyed 
was just as dangerous in Locke's eyes as it had been in the eyes of Royalists in the 1640s. 
Filmer's critique of Hunton, in other words, presented Locke with a particular kind of 
problem to solve. Locke needed to vindicate Hunton's fundamental claims that there is 
such a thing as limited monarchy and that where a monarch exceeds the limits of his 
authority active resistance is justified. But he needed also to show that this claim did not 
have potentially seditious practical consequences. He needed to be able to show that it 
could be articulated in a way which did not stand to be read as an incitement of subjects 
to resist their governors whenever their consciences told them that that would be 
permissible. It mattered to Locke that the Second Treatise be a treatise of government, 
not a treatise of anarchy.48 
4. Section Four  
Locke says at the beginning of the Second Treatise that what Filmer’s political thought 
shows is that, if “perpetual Disorder and Mischief, Tumult, Sedition and Rebellion . . .” 
are to be avoided, then we “must of necessity find out another rise of Government, another 
Original of Political Power, and another way of designing and knowing the Persons that 
have it” (II.1, 268). In other words, we must look to natural liberty, original contract, and 
consent as the way of knowing who has political authority. This will make it possible 
clearly to distinguish political power from other kinds of power, notably the power of 
parents, and to show that political power is limited in its extent to the protection of life, 
                                                 
47 There is much that is difficult to accept in Leo Strauss's reading of Locke, but he is right to say that 
Locke followed Hobbes's lead in regarding private conscience as nothing but private opinion. “Conscience,” 
Strauss concludes, “cannot therefore be a guide; still less can it supply sanctions.” Leo Strauss, Natural 
Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 222. One might add that the whole reason 
why the state of nature inevitably degenerates into a state of war is, according to Locke, our inability to 
make proper use of the executive right of the law of nature. The reasons why we go wrong in the exercise of 
that right are the reasons why we can go wrong in the exercise of the right of resistance. As James Tully 
observes, Locke cannot finesse Filmer's criticism of Hunton “because he accepts that men are partial in 
their judgements and uses it to partly explain why men enter political society and why they adopt the 
majority principle.” James Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 303. 
48 In this paper I follow Gordon Schochet in seeing not only the First Treatise but the whole of the Two 
Treatises as a response to Filmer. See Gordon Schochet, “The Family and the Origins of the State,” in John 
Locke: Problems and Perspectives, ed. John W. Yolton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 
82; see also Grant, Locke's Liberalism, chs. 2 and 3: 52-178, where the Two Treatises is read in terms of a 
debate between Locke and Filmer about how to draw the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
power. For a contrary view according to which the Second Treatise “should be understood independently 
of Locke's relationship with Filmer,” see Kiyoshi Shimokawa, “A Critique of Laslett's Treatment of the Two 
Treatises,” The Locke Newsletter 16 (1985): 35–52. 
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liberty, and property. In the process, the moral authority of political power will be 
explained, and de jure government differentiated from the merely de facto. There will 
then be—as there is not in Filmer's theory—a clear way of distinguishing lawful 
government from usurpation and tyranny. And at the same time, it will be made obvious 
that a tyrant may be resisted. That is, it will become apparent that, in Locke's careful 
words, “whosoever in Authority exceeds the Power given him by the Law, and makes use 
of the Force he has under his command, to compass that upon the Subject, which the Law 
allows not, ceases in that to be a Magistrate, and acting without Authority, may be 
opposed, as any other Man, who by force invades the Right of another” (II.202, 400–401). 
Locke knows that this cannot but raise Hunton's question as to who should decide when 
the power given by law has been exceeded. Indeed, Locke himself repeatedly raises the 
question in the Second Treatise. His answer is complex, and I shall return to it below, but 
it is clear at least that it does not involve Hunton's appeal to the moral judgment of each 
individual. In a mixed monarchy, Hunton had argued, no one “estate” had the right to 
judge of the actions of another.49 With respect to the most salient political controversy in 
England in the first half of the seventeenth century, this meant that the “democratical” 
element of the constitution did not have the ability to decide questions concerning the 
conduct of the monarch. That would have been to accord sovereignty to the House of 
Commons, and so would have been at odds with the basic principles of a mixed monarchy. 
Locke agrees with this, but, instead of giving the right of judgment to the individual 
conscience, he gives it to “the people.”50 Where there is a dispute between subjects and 
their governors, it is the body of the people who decide. “The People shall be Judge; for 
who,” Locke asks at the end of the Second Treatise, “shall be Judge whether his Trustee 
or Deputy acts well, and according to the Trust reposed in him, but he who deputes him, 
and must, by having deputed him still have a Power to discard him, when he fails in his 
Trust?” (II.240, 427). We will see, however, that this does not mean that the people are 
unequivocally sovereign in their relationship with their government. 
Having first made out his case for a right of resistance on the part of the people, 
though, Locke immediately subjects it to question: “May the Commands then of a Prince 
be opposed? May he be resisted as often as any one shall find himself aggrieved, and but 
imagine he has not Right done him?” “This,” the not so imaginary objector continues, 
“will unhinge and overturn all Polities, and instead of Government and Order, leave 
nothing but Anarchy and Confusion” (II.203, 401). Such, as we saw above, was Filmer's 
objection to consent theory. Locke's reply is that it is not the case that an individual may 
resist the prince as often as he finds himself aggrieved and imagines that he has been done 
wrong: “Force is to be opposed to nothing but to unjust and unlawful Force; whoever 
makes any opposition in any other Case, draws on himself a just Condemnation both from 
God and Man.” It follows that “no such Danger or Confusion will follow, as is often 
                                                 
49 Hunton, Monarchie, 289. 
50 This move on Locke's part is the central concern of Julian Franklin John Locke and the Theory of 
Sovereignty: Mixed Monarchy and the Right of Resistance in the Political Thought of the English 
Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). Franklin depicts Locke as having been shown 
the way toward the idea of a popular right of resistance by George Lawson's Politica Sacra et Civilis (1660), 
where, on Franklin's reading, the problems inherent in the position espoused by Hunton were finally 
overcome. I indicate some of my differences with Franklin's interpretation below. 
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suggested” (II.204, 402). Locke's point here is that the prospect of “a just Condemnation 
both from God and Man” will be sufficient to restrain subjects from making opposition to 
their prince in all situations other than those where the force used by the prince is plainly 
unjust and unlawful. With the English case specifically in mind, Locke observes that 
where the prince himself is incapable of being subject to judicial censure, there cannot be 
even the prospect of lawful resistance except in the extreme case of the prince “actually 
putting himself into a State of War with his People,” thus dissolving the government and 
returning his people to the state of nature (II.205, 402). There can be resistance to those 
who pretend to act in the prince's name and yet exceed the authority they have been given, 
but this is not resistance against the authority of the prince himself and so constitutes “no 
danger to Governor or Government” (II.206, 403).51 Even in countries where the prince 
is not above the law, it is extremely unlikely that the prince could pose such a threat to a 
subject as to elicit the kind of self-defensive violence that is justified in the face of, for 
example, highway robbery. The dispute is almost always going to be of the kind that can, 
and so should, be resolved in a court of law. Moreover, in the rare case where individuals 
do find their lives directly and immediately threatened by actions of the prince, though 
they may have a right to resist, “yet the Right to do so, will not easily ingage them in a 
Contest, wherein they are sure to perish,” “it being as impossible for one or a few 
oppressed Men to disturb the Government, where the Body of the People do not think 
themselves concerned in it, as for a raving mad Man, or heady Male-content to overturn 
a well-settled State; the People being as little apt to follow the one, as the other” (II.208, 
404). This last point shows that Locke's response to the objection he has raised against 
his own position consists as much in what considerations of prudence will suggest to 
subjects as it does in how subjects will be moved by the prospect of judgment by their 
fellows and by God.52 
A concern with what, as a matter of empirical fact, subjects are likely to do with a right 
of resistance reappears in the final chapter of the Second Treatise, where, having 
completed his account of the distinction between the dissolution of government and the 
dissolution of society, Locke again interrogates his own position. “To this perhaps it will 
be said,” he acknowledges, “that that the People being ignorant and always discontented, 
to lay the foundation of Government in the unsteady Opinion and uncertain Humour of 
                                                 
51 Hunton too is keen to make it clear that in a limited monarchy resistance is only permissible against 
the officers of the king, not against the king himself. Hunton, Monarchie, 49–50. 
52 Franklin finds Locke's appeal here to empirical generalisations about the character of the people 
“awkward and perhaps unfortunate”: “He is looking for a rule of morality or law that will enjoin a people 
from initiating civil law upon light and transient causes. But what he actually provides is a mere prediction 
of how a people is likely to behave. He might have done better to have said that isolated acts of tyranny must 
be tolerated by the public, with only peaceful protest, in consideration of the peace and good order of 
society.” Franklin, Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty, 96. As I read Locke, by contrast, there is no hope 
of a “rule of morality or law” that is sufficient to tell a people when they can resist and when they cannot. 
That is what is implicit in Locke's conception of an “appeal to heaven.” Furthermore, it is, so I am arguing, 
an absolutely central question for Locke, how people can be predicted to behave when they are shown that 
they have a right of resistance. For a helpful explanation of where Franklin goes wrong here, see J.K. 
Numao, “Right of Resistance Non-Anarchic: A Consideration of the Character of Locke's Defence,” Locke 
Studies 13 (2013): 65–96. I am not as confident as Numao, though, that Locke's defence of the right of 
resistance is “anarchy-free” (79) nor (relatedly) that Locke “maintains confidence in the rationality of the 
people as a matter of principle” (81). 
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the People, is to expose it to certain Ruin; And no Government will be able long to subsist, 
if the People may set up a new Legislative, whenever they take offence at the old one.” 
“People,” he replies, “are not so easily got out of their old Forms, as some are apt to 
suggest” (II.223, 414). But he knows this is not sufficient. It will be said even so, he 
accepts, that “this Hypothesis lays a ferment for frequent Rebellion” (II.224, 414). In the 
next seven paragraphs Locke explains why he does not think that his hypothesis will help 
to provoke frequent rebellions and why he thinks that it is, on the contrary, the doctrine 
of absolutism that is likely to provoke civil unrest by encouraging rulers in the arbitrary 
exercise of their power (II.224–30, 414–18). His reasoning is, again, empirical. The 
people will revolt when they are made extremely miserable and exposed to constant ill 
usage of arbitrary power, and they will do so regardless of what political philosophers say. 
But this will not happen “upon every little mismanagement in publick affairs” (II.225, 
415). The truth is that the doctrine of a right of resistance vested in the people is “the best 
fence against Rebellion” (II.26, 415) because magistrates, whether possessed of executive 
or legislative power, are much less likely to rebel—that is, return the country to a state of 
war by violating the terms of the trust that gave them their powers—if they know that the 
people takes itself to be empowered to fight back. When arbitrary power does excite 
resistance, that is not rebellion but rather self-defence. Those who say that resistance is 
never legitimate on account of the disturbance it causes “may as well say upon the same 
ground, that honest Men may not oppose Robbers or Pirates, because this may occasion 
disorder or bloodshed. If any mischief come in such Cases, it is not to be charged upon 
him, who defends his own right, but on him, that invades his Neighbours” (II.228, 417). 
Finally, Locke returns to the question of the character of the people “who . . . more 
disposed to suffer, than right themselves by Resistance, are not apt to stir.” “The examples 
of particular Injustice, or Oppression of here or there an unfortunate Man,” Locke claims, 
“moves them not” (II.230, 418). Where there have been great disorders in 
commonwealths, the cause has more often been the insolence of rulers than the 
wantonness of the people.53 
How the right of resistance would be used depended, to a significant extent, on how 
exactly resistance was defined by those who took it upon themselves to tell the people that 
they had a right to it. Locke wanted it to be clear that a right of resistance was different in 
kind from a right to rebellion. The very idea of a right of rebellion was in fact a 
contradiction in terms: it was the idea of a right to act against natural law in the pursuit 
of war rather than peace.54 The right of resistance was a reactive right, a right to repair 
                                                 
53 Richard Ashcraft claims, unconvincingly, that Locke's remarks about the slowness and aversion of 
the people to resist their rulers are all “heavily laden with irony.” Like Simmons (see above 15n45), he takes 
Locke to be engaged in “urging the people to engage in resistance.” Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics and 
Locke's Two Treatises of Government (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 309; emphasis in the 
original. Locke's view, though, is that the people will need no urging if sufficiently oppressed: “The People 
generally ill treated, and contrary to right, will be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of a burden 
that sits heavy upon them” (II.224, 415) Locke, as I read him, thinks that is a good thing that the people will 
not generally be disposed to resist when the burden that sits upon them is not unbearably heavy. Tully 
remarks that, in his explanation of why a right of resistance will not lead to anarchy, “Locke plays the 
conservative trump card of partiality and habit against his conservative opponents, showing that these 
causal factors make popular sovereignty more stable than absolutism.” Tully, Approach, 45. 
54 Locke's position is that it is usurpers and tyrants who “Rebellare, that is, bring again the state of War, 
and are properly Rebels” (II.226, 416). Harris argues that, strictly speaking, Locke was not a theorist of 
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damage done to the peaceful rule of law by the rebellious usurper or tyrant.55 It mattered 
also that the right of resistance be understood as possessed, in most cases, by the people 
as a whole, not by solitary individuals or minority groups. Locke was uncomfortable with 
the idea of a right to resist on the part of individuals. As we have seen, he does not 
completely rule out an individual right of resistance. He is willing to admit that there are 
circumstances in which individuals may resist their prince alone. “Private men,” he says, 
“have a right to defend themselves, and to recover by force, what by unlawful force is taken 
from them” (II.208, 404). It is a man in the singular who may cast about how to save 
himself when he finds himself in a ship bound for Algiers (II.210, 405). But, in line with 
his view that ultimately it is the people who judge how political power is used, Locke's 
default position is to speak in terms of controversy between the government and the 
people and to describe resistance as an act on the part of the people to reinstate legal order 
and civic peace. Throughout the climactic Chapter XIX “Of the Dissolution of 
Government,” the right of resistance is described as vested in the people, not in 
individuals.56 And a people is likely to be slower to act on such a right, more cautious and 
deliberate, than an individual, if only because it is very far from clear how Locke imagines 
a people, lacking a government to represent and speak for it, might make decisions and 
do anything at all. The general difficulties here would surely be exacerbated in the fraught 
circumstances of the dissolution of a system of government. 
Filmer, as we saw above, doubted “the judgment of the multitude in disposing of their 
sovereignty.” Another way in which Locke addressed the worry about what subjects would 
do with the right of resistance lay in his reticence when it came to the concept of 
sovereignty itself. Just as in the First Treatise Locke does not directly engage with Filmer's 
theory of sovereignty, so in the Second he does not explicitly develop a theory of 
                                                 
resistance at all, since the “rebel” had forfeited his authority and so was no longer a superior. What Locke 
calls resistance, according to Harris, is really just the protection of life, liberty, and property. Ian Harris, 
The Mind of John Locke: A Study of Political Theory in its Intellectual Setting (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 250. 
55 Though it has to be acknowledged that in II.220 (411) Locke allows that the people have a right not 
only to get out of tyranny but also to prevent it. “The state of Mankind is not so miserable,” he says there, 
“that they are not capable of using this Remedy, till it be too late to look for any.” Here “capable of using” 
surely means “entitled to use.” Nathan Tarcov comments that “Even Hobbes admits that when a society 
dissolves the people return to the state of nature and can set up a new one. Locke's new doctrine is that 
instead of waiting until it is too late we can act in the spirit of anticipation . . . Resistance is prevention and 
not a last resort, as it was traditionally viewed.” Nathan Tarcov, “Locke's 'Second Treatise' and 'The Best 
Fence against Rebellion',” The Review of Politics 43, no. 2 (April 1981): 211. 
56 On Locke's hesitancy with regard to the idea of a right of resistance on the part of individuals, see 
Jacqueline Stevens, “The Reasonableness of John Locke's Majority: Property Rights, Consent, and 
Resistance in the Second Treatise,” Political Theory 24, no. 3 (August 1996): 423–63. Individual resistance, 
according to Stevens, is in fact “precisely what [Locke] is careful to avoid” (445). It needs to be admitted, 
though, that Locke is not as clear as one might wish as to whether or not tyranny dissolves society as well 
as government, leaving individuals in the state of nature. As I read “Of the Disolution of Government” 
(II.211–243), it does not. Such is, I think, the implication of what Locke says at the very beginning of 
chapter: “He that will with any clearness speak of the Dissolution of Government, ought, in the first place 
to distinguish between the Dissolution of the Society, and the Dissolution of the Government” (II.211, 406). 
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sovereignty of his own.57 His priority is what does—and what does not—follow from 
natural liberty. This is his priority because his main concern is with the moral legitimacy 
of political power. For Locke, the first question is how the possessor of political power 
acquires a moral entitlement to the subject's obedience. And the answer to that question 
lies in the naturally free individual's consent. A theory of sovereignty is downstream, in 
terms of the flow of argument, from a workable account of political obligation. That said, 
there is nevertheless plainly a sense in which Locke conceives of the people as possessing 
sovereignty. The people are the ultimate source of law, that is to say the source of the 
authority of laws made by the legislature in its name. In most constitutions (though not 
in the English one) the power of the prince is, or should be, merely executive, even if he 
does, necessarily, also possess considerable prerogative power. Yet Locke is, again, 
nervous about the implications of unambiguously ascribing sovereignty to the people and 
writes as if it is only in a highly mitigated sense that, in the everyday run of things, they 
are sovereign. The Lockean people are not the Rousseauian people. Their “general will” is 
not the sole determinant of what is law and what is not. It is essential to Locke's vision of 
politics that the people's will needs to accommodate itself to God's will, in the form of the 
law of nature, before it can be said to make through its representatives binding laws that 
demand the obedience of subjects. When government is dissolved and power returns to 
the people, the people are not free to do absolutely anything they might want to do. No 
more than the state of individuals prior to government is the state of the people prior to 
government a state of license. This is one way of marking the full significance of Locke's 
theory of property. Individuals do not hold rights of property against the executive alone. 
They hold those rights against the people too. At the end of Chapter V “Of Property,” 
Locke says that “in Governments the Laws regulate the right of property, and the 
possession of land is determined by positive constitutions” (II.50, 302; see also II.120, 
348 ). But there are limits, imposed by the law of nature, to what governments are able to 
effect in the name of the people.58 
                                                 
57 Locke does not, for example, address the dispute between Hunton and Filmer about the possibility of 
sovereignty in a limited monarchy. Nor does he have anything to say in Two Treatises about how political 
sovereignty stands with respect to the laws of nature. Locke may have been influenced by Lawson's 
conception of the sovereignty of the people, as Franklin argues in Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty, but 
it could not be said that he himself addressed the conceptual issues that interested theorists such as Bodin, 
Hobbes, Rousseau, and Sièyes. Locke uses the word “sovereignty” only five times in the Second Treatise 
and never in the context of his theory of the proper nature and extent of the powers of government. In this 
regard, Locke's vindication of the right of resistance stands to be compared with that of the Glasgow 
professor of moral philosophy Gershom Carmichael, who in his commentary on Pufendorf approaches the 
question by way of a theory of sovereignty. Gershom Charmichael, “On the Limits of Sovereign Power and 
the Right of Resistance,” in Natural Rights on the Threshold of the Scottish Enlightenment: The Writings 
of Gershom Carmichael, eds. James Moore and Michael Silverthorne (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002), 
162–74. A comparison of Locke's and James Tyrrell's responses to Filmer exceeds the scope of this paper, 
but it can be noted that, unlike Locke, Tyrrell engages closely with Filmer's critique of Hunton: see James 
Tyrrell, Patriarcha Non Monarcha (London, 1681), chap. 4, 97–260. 
58 As David McNally argues in reply to Ashcraft's claim that Locke shared the radical agenda of the 
Levellers, Locke “provided a theory of property which invalidated attempts by any government to interfere 
with the properties of the individual without his consent.” David McNally, “Locke, Levellers, and Liberty: 
Property and Democracy in the Thought of the First Whigs,” History of Political Thought 10, no. 1 (Spring 
1989): 34. 
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Another important way in which Locke limits the significance of popular sovereignty 
is by emphasising that, in the aftermath of the institution by the people of a form of 
government, sovereign power is permanently (albeit conditionally) delegated by the 
people to their representatives. The legislative power, Locke says, is “the supream power 
of the Common-wealth . . . and unalterable in the hands where the Community have once 
placed it” (II.134, 356). While the community perpetually retains a supreme power of 
saving itself from the designs of tyrants, the community is not supreme “as considered 
under any Form of Government, because this Power of the People can never take place 
till the Government be dissolved” (II.149, 367), which is to say, until the government is 
dissolved, not by the people, but by those in government when they misuse the power 
with which the people have entrusted them. The point is made again in the final paragraph 
of the Second Treatise, where Locke writes that “when the Society hath placed the 
Legislative in any Assembly of Men, to continue in them and their Successors, with 
Direction and Authority for providing for such Successors, the Legislative can never 
revert to the People whilst that Government lasts” (II.243, 428). This is the 
constitutionalist element of Locke's thought.59 Here again there is a contrast with 
Rousseau, for whom the single most important truth in politics is that popular sovereignty 
cannot be alienated by the people so as to be exercised in the people's name by a 
government of representatives.60 The constitution, according to Rousseau, always stands 
to be revised by the will of the people, in regular and scheduled Machiavellian moments 
when government is dissolved and the sovereign people decides whether or not things 
should go on as they have hitherto. By contrast, sovereignty only returns to the Lockean 
people either when the government has acted tyrannically or when it has failed seriously 
in the execution of the laws. In normal circumstances, the people are properly said to be 
subject to a sovereign, or “Supream,” legislator or legislature (see II.134, 427–28). They 
may also, Locke allows, be said to be subject to the executive as well.61 In other words, the 
people cannot decide, of their own accord and without provocation, to change the form of 
government—for example, in order to make government more democratic. The people do 
not have that power. They have the power to alter the constitution only when government 
has in effect caused the constitution no longer to exist. Until that time, the people are just 
as bound by the terms of the original contract as is the government. Not only that, the 
                                                 
59 Grant claims that Locke replaces sovereignty theory with constitutionalism: “Once it is understood 
that the law is supreme over any private will and the people are supreme in the sense that they determine 
when their trust has been violated, the central issue for political theory no longer is to identify whose will is 
sovereign.” Grant, Locke's Liberalism, 201. One of the referees for this journal suggested that what Locke 
does is replace sovereignty with, simply, government. 
60 On the significance of Rousseau's distinction between the sovereignty of the people and the delegated 
powers of government, see Richard Tuck, The Sleeping Sovereign: The Invention of Modern Democracy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
61 See II.151, 368, where Locke argues, with the English case in mind, that “In some Commonwealths 
where the Legislative is not always in being, and the Executive is vested in a single Person, who has also a 
share in the Legislative; there that single Person in a very tolerable sense may also be called Supream.” As 
we saw above, Locke makes sure to accommodate also the English principle that the monarch is above the 
law. 
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people are, in normal circumstances, bound to obey the government. The government is 
not, in normal circumstances, answerable to the will of the people.62 
The final mitigation of popular sovereignty that I want to draw attention to here comes 
into view with Locke's full account of the legal dynamics of the situation where there is a 
stand-off between people and government, where the people accuses the government of 
tyranny, and where the government denies (as it is likely to do) that that is the right 
description of what is going on. This is where Hunton's question of who shall be judge is 
of critical importance. As we saw above, Locke's answer is that the people shall be judge 
of whether or not the power they have entrusted to magistrates has been properly used. 
It is important, however, to see exactly what it is, according to Locke, that the people are 
judge of. For Locke does not claim that the people are entitled to settle a disagreement 
between themselves and government according to their judgment as to the rights and 
wrongs of the situation. He first spells out his answer to the Hunton's question—which he 
describes as “the old Question”—at the end of Chapter XIV “Of Prerogative” (II.159–68, 
374–80). There he begins by making a move which shows that he does not mean simply 
to replace Hunton's appeal to the individual conscience with an appeal of his own to the 
collective conscience of the body of the people. “Should either the Executive, or the 
Legislative, when they have got the Power in their hands, design, or go about to enslave, 
or destroy [the people],” he writes, “there can be no Judge on Earth,” because there is no 
court in which such a dispute could be settled. It follows, according to Locke, that “the 
People have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no Judge on 
Earth, but to appeal to Heaven” (II.168, 380). The power of judgment that the people 
have is, according to Locke, properly understood, the power “to judge whether they have 
a just Cause to make their Appeal to Heaven.” And the right to make an appeal is, needless 
to say, not the right to a decision in one's own favour. Elsewhere in the Second Treatise 
Locke uses the Old Testament story of Jephthah in order to illustrate the point (II.21, 282; 
II.109, 340–41; II.176, 385–86; II.241, 427). There was no court on Earth to settle 
Jephthah's dispute with the Ammonites, so he had no choice but to go to war against his 
antagonists, in the hope that God would judge his cause to be the just one and give him 
victory. 63 The point of the story, as read by Locke, is that while Jephthah had the right to 
lead his army out to battle, it was God who was judge of the dispute. God, in his justice, 
could have decided against Jephthah and given victory to the Ammonites.64 
                                                 
62 The idea, argued for most comprehensively by Ashcraft, that Locke was in essence a theorist of 
democracy seems to me to have been thoroughly discredited by McNally, “Locke, Levellers, and Liberty”; 
Gordon J. Schochet, “Radical Politics and Ashcraft's Treatise on Locke,” Journal of the History of Ideas 50, 
no. 3 (Jul.–Sep. 1989): 491–510; Ellen Meiksins Wood, “Locke Against Democracy: Consent, 
Representation, and Suffrage in the Two Treatises,” History of Political Thought 13, no. 4 (Winter 1992): 
570–602; and David Wootton, “John Locke and Ashcraft's Revolutionary Politics,” Political Studies 40, no. 
1 (March 1992): 79–98. 
63 The story is told in Judges 11. It is important to the story that the dispute between Jephthah and 
Ammonites is complex. It is possibly also significant, for Locke's purposes, that it is a dispute over property. 
Though God gives victory to Jephthah, it is at a cost: having sworn he would do so if God enabled him to 
defeat the Ammonites, Jephthah has to sacrifice his daughter, his only child, and “offer [her] up for a burnt 
offering.” 
64 Dunn is, I think, exactly right in his explication of the appeal to heaven: “The right of resistance is an 
individual right of initiative in the making of an appeal. But neither in practical effect nor in legal 
determination has an individual the right to conduct the prosecution or execute the appropriate sentence.” 
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The people's right of judgment, in other words, is the right to judge when they have 
been placed in a state of war with their government. This is not a right anyone can lay 
down, for it is the right to defend one's life, the life which one has been given by one's 
creator, in the face of a course of action that is a threat to it. “Every man is Judge for 
himself,” Locke insists, “. . . whether another hath put himself into a State of War with 
him, and whether he should appeal to the Supreme Judge, as Jephtha did” (II.241, 427). 
Needless to say, one who has a right of appeal cannot be punished for making an appeal. 
But, given the cost in terms of the suffering inflicted upon a nation by the exercise of the 
right of resistance, one who appeals to Heaven by going to war against his government 
needs to be certain that this is a better course of action than remaining patient in the face 
of injustice.65 And this means, Locke is confident, that no one is likely to engage in 
resistance lightly, without the most severe provocation: for “he that appeals to Heaven, 
must be sure he has Right on his side; and a Right too that is worth the Trouble and Cost 
of the Appeal, as he will answer at a Tribunal, that cannot be deceived, and will be sure to 
retribute to every one according to the Mischiefs he hath created to his Fellow-Subjects; 
that is, any part of Mankind” (II.176, 386).66 This brings into relief what may, in the end, 
be the main reason for Locke's confidence that the right of resistance will not be misused 
and become an excuse for casual sedition, the fact that, as he sees it, human beings live 
sharply conscious of God, of his power, and of the consequences of displeasing him—
while, at the same time, they live conscious of God's mysteriousness and of the difficulty 
of knowing for sure what his judgment will be.67 This consciousness of the divine, at once 
vivid and elusive, is sufficient to prevent men from falling away into anarchy and violent 
disorder. There is no need of Filmer's earthly absolute sovereign.68 
                                                 
Dunn, Political Thought, 181–82. There is no discussion at all of the appeal to heaven in Franklin, Locke 
and the Theory of Sovereignty. Franklin states that Locke is consistent on the “central point” that 
“revolution is appropriate where a people is confronted with a calculated design to subvert its constitution 
and reduce it to a state of servitude” (97). As I read Locke, by contrast, the people are never in a position to 
know for sure that revolution is justified; see also Emily C. Nacol, “The Risks of Political Authority: Trust, 
Knowledge, and Political Agency in Locke's Second Treatise,” Political Studies 59, no. 3 (October 2011): 
580–95. The people revolt in the face of tyranny, in the hope that God will judge that their cause is superior 
to all the considerations that speak in favour of maintaining civil peace. Whether or not this hope is well-
founded will be revealed only at the Last Judgment. 
65 Dunn suggests that where the costs to society at large of an act of resistance outweigh the suffering 
caused by tyranny, it is not that the right is trumped by another right but rather that there is no right to 
resist in the first place. Dunn, Political Theory, 186n2. 
66 Also, “I my self can only be Judge in my own Conscience, as I will answer it at the great Day, to the 
Supream Judge of all Men.” II.21, 282. 
67 Francis Oakley, “Locke, Natural Law, and God—Again,” History of Political Thought 18, no. 4 (Winter 
1997): 624–51. Oakley (651), illustrating Locke's “theological temperament,” quotes from Locke's 
Examination of Malebranche: “I think it more possible for me to see with other men's eyes, and understand 
with another man's understanding, than with God's.” 
68 As Ashcraft puts it, “Locke's disagreements with Hobbes or Filmer are never merely political 
disagreements, but reflect a different conception of how things are in the universe, especially with regard 
to the relationship between God and man” Ashcraft, Locke's Two Treatises of Government, 46. 
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5. Section Five 
My concern here has been with the practical consequences that Locke did and, especially, 
did not want Two Treatises of Government to have. An interest in the practical 
dimension of Locke's politics—in what he wanted to effect in writing and promulgating 
the Two Treatises—was, of course, central to the revolution in Locke studies initiated by 
Peter Laslett in the 1950s. On Laslett's reading, the Two Treatises was written not by 
Locke the philosopher but by Locke the physician, in the attempt to cure an English case 
of the French disease of absolute and arbitrary government.69 Filmer's influence on the 
Tories during the Exclusion Crisis was Laslett's principal reason for dating the 
composition of the first draft of the Two Treatises to the very early 1680s. The book as a 
whole, according to Laslett, “is an Exclusion Tract, not a Revolution Pamphlet.”70 And 
even while the question of the exact date of the first draft remains unsettled, it seems 
indisputable that the book had its ultimate origin in Shaftesbury's campaign against 
Charles II. The problem, though, with the intense interest that there has been, since 
Laslett, in the precise character of Locke's intentions in writing the Two Treatises is that 
it becomes all too easy to lose sight of the question, surely just as interesting, of what 
Locke might have meant to achieve in publishing the book in late 1689, in the immediate 
aftermath of the replacement of James II by William and Mary.71 How, exactly, was an 
Exclusion Tract to be turned into a Revolution Pamphlet? The main difficulty here is the 
First Treatise. It is easy enough to see how the Second Treatise might have been thought, 
in Locke's words from the Preface, “sufficient to establish the Throne of our Great 
Restorer, Our present King William,” to show William's title to lie in the consent of the 
people, and to justify to the world the people of England.72 But what was the relevance of 
a long refutation of Sir Robert Filmer in 1689? Why did Locke publish the First Treatise 
along with the Second? Two answers suggest themselves. The first is that Locke simply 
did not want to waste all the work he had done on Filmer, even if “Fate” had already 
“disposed of” a large part of it. We know, though, that Locke left unpublished many other 
works, major and minor. So, it seems rather more likely that answering Filmer was as 
important to Locke in 1689 as it had been ten years earlier. I shall end with a speculative 
hypothesis as to why this might have been. 
                                                 
69 See Laslett, Introduction to Two Treatises, 64; 86. 
70 Laslett, Introduction to Two Treatises, 61. Dunn comments that “There is no doubt that if the text of 
the Two Treatises as we have it now is exclusively or even predominantly an Exclusion tract, it is often a 
notably ham-fisted one.” Dunn, Political Thought, 53. The key phrase in this sentence might well be “as we 
have it now,” for there is no sure way of knowing how far the published text resembles the first draft. 
71 Locke, Preface to Two Treatises, 137. Locke's intentions in publishing the book have not, however, 
been completely ignored: see Charles D. Tarlton, “'The Rulers Now on Earth': Locke's Two Treatises and 
the Revolution of 1688,” The Historical Journal 28, no. 2 (June 1985): 279–98, who argues that Locke 
meant the book as a warning to William when he seemed to be repeating the mistakes of the Stuarts and 
Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, 590–601, who argues that “Locke's decision to publish his work . . . was 
an act of solidarity with the radical cause as it existed in 1689–1690”. See also the works cited below at 
28n81. 
72 Locke, Preface to Two Treatises, 137. 
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In April 1689 the Convention Parliament passed an Act requiring all holders of civil 
and ecclesiastical offices to take a new oath of allegiance to William and Mary.73 Those 
who did not take it by 1 August would be suspended and eventually deprived of office. 
Almost everyone took it, but not all for the same reasons. The oath generated an intense 
debate about why it was permissible for those who had previously sworn allegiance to 
James II to now bind themselves to obey the new regime even though James was still alive 
and maintained his claim to the throne, and even though he had a natural heir whose 
claim might be thought to remain intact if James himself had somehow lost his title. Close 
to two hundred contributions to this debate would be published between the spring of 
1689 and late 1694. A number of them make use of de facto arguments from present 
possession.74 The most notable, in terms of the number of copies sold, was William 
Sherlock's The Case of Allegiance due to Soveraign Powers. “He is our King,” Sherlock 
argued, “who is settled in the Throne in the actual Administration of Soveraign Power.”75 
We know what Locke thought of those who sought in this way to avoid answering the 
question of the present status of James Stuart's claim to the throne because he is explicit 
about it in a brief manuscript commentary on the matter, dating probably from the spring 
of 1690.76 To distinguish between a king de jure and a king de facto, and to call William a 
king in the latter sense only, Locke claims in this manuscript, is effectively to call William 
a usurper: “For what is an Usurper but a King actually in a throne to which he has noe 
right.”77 This was the view of those who had denied that James had left his throne vacant 
and who had argued that William should only be accepted as regent. In so far as it was the 
view of men in positions of power, as it certainly was, it was plainly a threat to the entire 
Revolution settlement: “For how can it be expected the people should be firme to a 
government that is not soe to it self and does not assert its owne right.”78 It was 
“absolutely necessary to the very being and subsistance of our government” and to the 
securing of peace and the Protestant religion, that all, whatever their private opinions, 
“joyne in a sincere loyalty to his present Majestie and a support of his government.”79 It 
                                                 
73 Mark Goldie, “The Revolution of 1689 and the Structure of Political Argument: An Essay and an 
Annotated Bibliography of Pamphlets on the Allegiance Controversy,” Bulletin of Research in the 
Humanities 83 (1980): 473–564. 
74 Goldie, “Revolution of 1689,” 487–88; John P. Kenyon, Revolution Principles: The Politics of Party 
1689-1720 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), chap. 3, 21–34. 
75 William Sherlock, The Case of Allegiance due to Soveraign Powers, Stated and Resolved (London, 
1691), 14. 
76 “On Allegiance and the Revolution,” [April 1690?], Lovelace Collection, MS Locke e. 18, Bodelian 
Library, Oxford University, in “John Locke on the Glorious Revolution: A Rediscovered Document,” by 
James Farr and Clayton Roberts, The Historical Journal 28, no. 2 (June 1985): 385–98. On the significance 
of the manuscript for understanding the argument of Second Treatise, especially for Locke's doctrine of 
tacit consent, see G.A. den Hartogh, “Express Consent and Full Membership in Locke,” Political Studies 38, 
no. 1 (March 1990): 105–15. 
77 Locke, “On Allegiance,” in “Locke on the Glorious Revolution,” by Farr and Roberts, 397. 
78 Locke, “On Allegiance,” in “Locke on the Glorious Revolution,” by Farr and Roberts, 398. 
79 Locke, “On Allegiance,” in “Locke on the Glorious Revolution,” by Farr and Roberts, 395. 
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was necessary, in other words, for all to affirm William as rightful monarch and to 
explicitly abjure allegiance to James. 
It is possible, I suggest, that Locke published the Two Treatises as a long and 
somewhat indirect argument to the same conclusion and that he thought that the First 
Treatise needed to be included precisely because of the de facto element of Filmer's 
political thought. That aspect of Filmer's argument made it possible, so Locke might have 
feared, for Filmer's texts to provide a rationale for those who had supported James II, but 
who now were willing to accept the authority of the Williamite regime, but only on de 
facto grounds.80 To Locke, this would have seemed a dangerously mistaken 
understanding of the new regime's claim to authority because it left the regime unable to 
claim for itself a moral authority distinct from that of the successful usurper, and so, in 
effect, left intact the de jure claim of the Stuarts. Hence it left open the possibility that the 
Stuarts might, rightfully, return to press that claim at some point in the future. The point 
was not that Filmer gave intellectual justification for the position of the Non-Jurors, who 
refused to take the new oath of allegiance. They did not matter. Much more dangerous—
practically speaking—was the fact that Filmer provided the wrong kinds of reason for 
swearing allegiance to the new regime. They were the wrong kinds of reasons because they 
did not preclude continuing allegiance to the Stuarts and kept open, morally speaking, 
the possibility of turning against William and Mary and of returning the country to a state 
of war. In this way it is possible to refine Laslett's ground-breaking insight that the Two 
Treatises was in part a work of practical politics, not solely a piece of political theory, and 
to apply that insight to the publication as well as to the composition of the text.81 Seen in 
the context of the debate about the oath of allegiance to William and Mary, the Two 
Treatises is an Engagement, not an Exclusion, Tract. It is only proper, however, to end 
with an admission that the work necessary to properly substantiate this hypothesis has 
yet to be done. It is, for the moment, not entirely clear how significant a presence Filmer 
was in the debate about the legitimacy of the Williamite regime. We have Locke's 
explanation, in the Preface to the Two Treatises, that he would not have been so rough 
with an author unable to answer for himself “had not the Pulpit, of late Years, publickly 
                                                 
80 It may also be, as Goldie notes, that Chapter XVI “Of Conquest” (II.175–96, 384–97) was written as 
a reply to those who argued that William's was a right of conquest. Mark Goldie, “Edmund Bohun and Ius 
Gentium in the Revolution Debate, 1689–1693,” The Historical Journal 20, no. 3 (September 1977): 585. 
81 Laslett himself appears to have had little interest in the question why in 1689 Locke published what 
he had written against Filmer ten years previously, although he does accept that “There is force in the claim 
that it was still necessary for a Whig writer to go to some trouble to refute Filmer as later as 1689.” Laslett, 
Introduction to Two Treatises, 51–52. Den Hartogh emphasises the importance to Locke of establishing 
William and Mary's full de jure claim to the obedience of their subjects. This, according to den Hartogh, is 
why Locke makes a categorical distinction between “tacit” and “express” consent. Den Hartogh, “Express 
Consent,” 105–15. More recently Michael Davis has considered the Two Treatises as what he calls “a work 
of practical ethics,” as opposed to a work either of political philosophy or of political rhetoric, polemic, or 
propaganda. “A work of practical ethics,” Davis explains, “tries to resolve a particular moral problem of 
some individual or group” (464). As Davis argues, the moral problem Locke was trying to resolve was 
whether or not those whose who had sworn allegiance to James II might now swear allegiance to William 
and Mary. Michael Davis, “Locke on Consent: The Two Treatises as Practical Ethics,” The Philosophical 
Quarterly 62, no. 248 (July 2012): 464–85. 
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owned his Doctrine, and made it the Currant Divinity of the Times.”82 It would be helpful, 
though, for the purposes of better understanding Locke's intentions in publishing the Two 
Treatises to know exactly what use the pulpit had made of Filmer's doctrine during the 
1680s.83 84 
University of St Andrews 
  
                                                 
82 Locke, Preface to Two Treatises, 138. 
83 There is disappointingly little information on this score in Cuttica, Sir Robert Filmer, chap. 9, 231-
45. 
84 I am very grateful to Mark Goldie, Tim Stanton, and Tim Stuart Buckle for their comments on a draft 
of this paper. I was asked good questions about Locke and Filmer by audiences at Boston University, 
Gakushuin University, Oxford University, and York University, and I thank Aaron Garrett, Susanne 
Sreedhar, Kiyoshi Shimokawa, Teresa Bejan, and Martin O'Neill for making those visits possible. Patrick 
Connolly gave me very useful comments when I presented an early version of the paper at the 2018 
conference of The John Locke Society. I am glad to thank also two referees for Locke Studies, and the 
journal's Editor and Assistant Editor. 
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